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Abstract
This paper estimates the effect of hospital admissions among older workers on economic
outcomes across countries. We use harmonized longitudinal survey data from the United States,
China, and 13 countries in Europe, and follow the event study design of Dobkin et al. (2018)
to estimate dynamic effects of a hospitalization on out-of-pocket health expenditures, labor
market outcomes, social insurance payments, and household income. We find distinctly different
patterns across countries. In contrast to the United States, where hospitalizations lead to large
health expenditures and decreases in earnings, individuals in Northern and Southern Europe
are largely protected from negative economic outcomes. Hospitalizations in China lead to even
larger out-of-pocket expenditures as a percent of prior income, but do not negatively affect labor
market outcomes. Our results largely align with the differences in generosity across countries
in social protection institutions that include health systems, social security programs and labor
market regulations.
∗We thank our discussant, Raquel Fonseca, two anonymous referees, and editors for excellent comments. The
work was presented at the Gateway to Global Aging Data Research Conference, funded by the National Institute on
Aging (2R01 AG030153).
†Corina Mommaerts: Department of Economics, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA. Email:
cmommaerts@wisc.edu.
‡Syed Hassan Raza: National University of Sciences and Technology, Social Sciences and Humanities, Islamabad,
Pakistan. Email: dr.hassanraza@s3h.nust.edu.pk.




Work in later life is often a crucial period for building retirement savings. Fresh evidence on
life-cycle wage growth across countries shows that wages peak around the age of 50 across many
countries, though life-cycle wage growth is steeper in rich than in poor countries (Lagakos et al.,
2018). This period of working life is also much more susceptible to health shocks. For example,
45-64 year olds are 33% more likely to have an overnight hospitalization than 20-44 year olds (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). Health shocks not only pose immediate medical
expenditure risk, but also have a wide range of economic consequences on jobs, earnings, and
household finances. In the United States, for example, Dobkin et al. (2018) document that the latter
economic costs associated with hospital admission can overshadow the immediate cost of out-of-
pocket medical spending. While health insurance provides protection against medical expenditure
risk, protection against downstream labor market consequences rests with other types of insurance
programs, including disability, sick pay, and retirement programs. As many countries around the
world grapple with how to design these programs, it is particularly important to understand the
economic consequences of shocks late in life under various institutional settings.
In this paper, we document the economic consequences of health shocks among older workers
across countries using micro-level data to gain insights into how institutional and policy factors
affect economic outcomes. To do this, we use the Harmonized Health and Retirement Study family
of surveys consolidated by the Gateway to Global Ageing Data. Our core sample includes the United
States between 2000-2014 from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 13 European countries
between 2007-2015 from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), which
we group into Northern Europe, Southern Europe, and Western Europe, and China between 2010-
2014 from the China Health and Retirement Survey (CHARLS). This set of countries provides an
interesting comparison set because, one, as we will discuss shortly, major types of health systems
are represented by the countries in our sample; and two, our sample covers countries of different
income levels and at different stages of development.
Our empirical strategy uses an event study approach around discrete health shocks. Following
Dobkin et al. (2018), we examine the effects of six economic outcomes, including out-of-pocket med-
ical expenditures, respondent earnings, spousal earnings, work status, social insurance payments,
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and total household income, for older workers aged between 50 and 59 who have health insurance
coverage. We exploit the panel nature of each dataset to estimate these effects for several years
after the hospitalization relative to a pre-trend in these outcomes prior to hospitalization.
We find distinctly different patterns around the world. In Northern and Southern Europe,
out-of-pocket medical expenses do not rise significantly upon a hospital admission, suggesting that
the (universal) healthcare systems in these countries insure individuals well against typical medical
costs associated with a hospital admission. Moreover, while there is a gradual decline in income
that begins several years before the hospitalization event, there is no significant drop in total
income after the hospitalization from this trend. In contrast, hospitalizations in Western Europe
and the United States lead to significant and persistent out-of-pocket medical costs and significant
declines in earnings and employment. Social insurance payments significantly increase, and while it
is enough to offset the earnings decline in Western Europe, it is not in the United States and thus
total income significantly declines in the years following a hospitalization (as shown in Dobkin et al.,
2018). In China, out-of-pocket medical expenses increase substantially after a hospitalization, but
earnings do not fall.
To understand whether some of these estimated effects are driven by differential admission to
hospitals that may be correlated with later economic outcomes, we also examine the effects of
hospitalization on health outcomes. Indeed, we find that self-reported work limitations and health
status appear to be worse in the United States and Western Europe following a hospitalization,
which may help explain the more pronounced negative labor market effects in these countries.
These patterns can also be interpreted to some degree in light of the institutional differences
across countries. For medical costs, Northern and Southern Europe have relatively generous social
health insurance programs that protect individuals from most of the cost of a hospitalization, unlike
in the United States and in China where health insurance programs have lower coverage rates.
Analogously, European countries typically have more generous disability and sick pay programs
and stronger labor market protection that may help cushion potential difficulties in returning to
work after a hospitalization. Using country-wide data on the social protections for health, disability,
and work, we find evidence that in countries where the government plays a larger and more active
role in these protections, the effects of hospitalizations on out-of-pocket health expenditures are
smaller, and in countries with stronger employment protections the negative effect on earnings is
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also dampened. These results largely align with the cross-regional differences in our main analysis
and the institutional details characterizing these regions.
Our results add to a growing empirical literature on the link between health and economic
activities over the life-cycle (see Prinz et al. (2018) and Currie and Madrian (1999) for reviews).
Earlier work in this area measured effects of changes in a variety of health measures on consump-
tion, earnings, and medical costs in the United States (e.g., Cochrane (1991); Smith (2005)), while
more recent studies often focus on sharper health “shocks” such as hospitalizations, use rich struc-
tural models, incorporate administrative data, and evaluate effects in other countries (Dobkin et al.
(2018) and De Nardi et al. (2018) in the United States, Garćıa-Gómez et al. (2017) in the Nether-
lands, Parro and Pohl (2018) in Chile). Much of this work finds large effects of hospitalization on
earnings. We contribute to this literature by examining the effects of hospitalizations on economic
outcomes in a variety of countries using harmonized data and methods.1
This paper also contributes to the literature on international comparisons of health (see Banks
and Smith (2011) for a review). As argued in Kapteyn (2010), cross-country comparisons can
be a useful way to evaluate the effects of institutions and policies, which can vary dramatically
across countries but less so within countries. However, many previous studies making international
comparisons rely on datasets and/or identification strategies that are only loosely comparable. This
makes credible comparisons across countries difficult because variation across countries may simply
be due to different econometric assumptions, sampling frames, or question wording. Using the
Gateway to Global Ageing Data allows us to use the same estimation strategy on datasets that
were specifically designed to mirror the HRS in the United States, though of course such a design
cannot completely eliminate concerns over comparability. This hopefully provides more confidence
that differences in results across countries are due to economic, institutional, and cultural differences
between countries rather than data or methodological differences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the health and
social insurance systems in the United States, Europe, and China. Section 3 presents our data
and methodology, and Section 4 reports our main results and investigates potential mechanisms.
Section 5 explores interaction effects with country-wide measures of social protections, and Section
1Garćıa-Gómez (2011) and Trevisan and Zantomio (2016) have similar aims, though they only study European
countries and do not focus on hospitalizations. Gupta et al. (2015) compares Denmark to the United States, but
focuses on a narrow set of health shocks and non-harmonized data.
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6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background in the United States, Europe, and
China
The economic consequences of hospitalizations may hinge to a large extent on the institutions in
place to combat adverse health shocks. Around the world, the scope of these institutions varies
widely, even between countries at similar levels of development. In this section, we review so-
cial health protections across the countries in our study from both a qualitative and quantitative
perspective.2 In particular, the set of institutions we review include healthcare systems (which
determine how healthcare is financed), disability and sickness benefits provisions (which determine
how negative income impacts from illness are mitigated), and more generally the strictness of labor
market protection (which determine how jobs are protected after an illness). We use country-level
data on health systems, disability and sickness benefits, and labor market protections from the
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) as measures of the various institutional regimes for the countries in our sample
during our sample period (see Section 5 for more details). This section also provides some motiva-
tion for how we group the countries in our sample into larger regions in the econometric analysis
in Section 4.
2.1 Health Care Systems Around the World
Health care systems often fall under four broad models: the “Beveridge” model, the “Bismark”
model, the “national health insurance” model, and the “out-of-pocket” model (Reid, 2010). In the
“Beveridge” model, healthcare is financed by the government through taxes. The government, as
the single payer for medical bills, employs most of the health staff, has power to control costs,
and ensures that healthcare is approximately free at the point of service. This type of healthcare
system is emblematic of the systems in the United Kingdom, most of Scandinavia (i.e. largely in
2The International Labor Organization (ILO) defines social health protection as “a series of public or publicly
organized and mandated private measures against social distress and economic loss caused by the reduction of pro-
ductivity, stoppage or reduction of earnings, or the cost of necessary treatment that can result from ill health” and
achieving universal social health protection coverage, defined as effective access to affordable quality health care and
financial protection in case of sickness, is a central objective for the ILO (International Labor Organization, 2008).
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our Northern Europe sample), as well as Greece, Italy, and Spain (i.e. largely in our Southern
Europe sample).
In contrast, the “Bismark” model is a multi-payer social insurance model. Under this model,
employers and employees contribute to a “sickness fund” through payroll deductions which are
managed by one or more insurers, and health providers are generally private. Patients pay for their
medical bills with the help of their insurer. Insurers and health providers are, however, subject to
tight government regulations to ensure broad access to healthcare, relatively low healthcare costs,
and low profit margins for insurers. This model is widely used in Belgium, Germany, France,
Switzerland (i.e. largely in our Western Europe sample) and perhaps to a lesser extent in urban
China.
The “national health insurance” model has elements of the aforementioned two models in that
it features a single payer (i.e. the government) for health services, as in the “Beveridge” model,
but has many private health providers, as in the “Bismark” model. The most prominent example
of this model is Canada. Lastly, the “out-of-pocket” model is essentially market-driven healthcare,
observed primarily in less developed countries where the government does not have the resources or
political power to run or oversee a healthcare system. Rural China fell squarely into this category
before the launch of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System (NRCMS) in 2003. However,
despite near universal coverage of the rural population by the NRCMS, rural households still face
out-of-pocket rates of over 50% (Mattke et al., 2014).
The United States healthcare system is unique in that households are exposed to different
healthcare models depending on their age, occupation, income, etc. For example, the Veterans
Health Administration is a government-run healthcare system, funded primarily through general
taxes, that provides healthcare to American veterans (i.e., the “Beveridge” model). In contrast,
working Americans often have employer-sponsored health insurance and receive care from private
health providers (i.e., the “Bismark” model), while the elderly and the impoverished are covered
by Medicare and Medicaid, respectively, which contain both private and public elements (i.e., the
“national health insurance” model), and the uninsured population is subject to the “out-of-pocket”
model.
To visualize these different healthcare models, we make use of the health financing data from
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the WHO.3 One would expect that the out-of-pocket model (e.g., China) entails low government
spending on health and the Beveridge model (e.g., Northern and Southern Europe) entails high
government spending, while the Bismark model (e.g., Western Europe) lies somewhere in between.
Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the domestic general government health expenditures as a percentage
of current health expenditures for all countries in our sample averaged from 2000 to 2015. The
Chinese government shoulders just over 40% of all health expenditures (red bar), while at 50%
the US government’s expenditure on health is the second lowest in our sample (black bar). All
European countries have more substantial government involvement in the health financing: the
governments of Luxembourg and Belgium in Western Europe (the top two blue bars) as well as
Denmark and Sweden in Northern Europe (the top two dark blue bars) contribute over 80% of health
expenditures. The European countries with the lowest government health expenditure shares are
Switzerland and Greece, which are just above 60%. This is consistent with the general perception
that government is more important in healthcare provision in Europe than in the United States
or China, though within Europe there is no simple mapping between a country’s healthcare model
and the level of government financing.
These differences in healthcare systems may help explain differences in out-of-pocket expendi-
tures as a result of a hospital admission. To understand institutional factors that may help explain
differences in labor market outcomes, we turn to social security programs such as sick pay leave
and benefit schemes, disability insurance, and labor market protection against dismissals.
2.2 Sick Pay, Disability, and Labor Market Protections
Sick pay schemes often provide job protection as well as income replacement during an absence
due to illness, and thus may affect short-term earnings and labor force status. Like healthcare
systems, there are also wide disparities across countries in the generosity of these schemes. For
example, Heymann et al. (2009) finds that among the 22 OECD nations, the United States is the
only country that does not legally require employers to offer paid sick leave to workers undergoing
3We use the domestic general government health expenditure (GGHE-D) as a percentage of current health ex-
penditures (CHE) as the main measure of government health financing. Alternatively, using the percentage of CHE
spent by compulsory financing arrangements (CFA), which includes government financing arrangements, compulsory
health insurance, and social health insurance, gives very similar results.
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a 50-day hospitalization.4 In contrast, Luxembourg and Norway provide 50 days of paid sick leave
at 100% replacement rate of wage, while Austria provides 46 full-time equivalent working days’ pay,
Germany 44, Belgium 39, Sweden 38, Denmark 36, Netherlands 35, Spain 32, Italy 29, Greece 29,
France 24, Ireland 17, and Switzerland 15. China also requires employers to offer sick leave of at
least 30 days at a replacement rate of 60% (Ministry of Labor, 1994).
Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows public expenditures on sickness and disability benefits as a per-
centage of GDP, as measured by the OECD, for all of the countries in our sample except China.
The United States spends 1.27% of GDP on disability and sickness benefits, the lowest among the
OECD countries in our sample. At the other end, the Northern European countries – Denmark
(4.50%) and Sweden (4.73%) – are among the countries that spend the most on disability and
sickness benefits. Western and Southern European countries spend between 1.6% and 3% of their
GDP on such benefits. As we examine in Section 4.5, disability insurance may play a strong role in
the economic outcomes following a hospital admission, particularly if hospitalizations are correlated
with disability. It may also have larger effects on longer-term outcomes than healthcare and sick
pay programs, which are targeted to shorter-term relief.
Finally, to investigate how labor market protections differ across countries in our sample, we
use the OECD’s indicator of the strictness of employment protections, which measures on a scale
of 1 to 4 how strictly individual and collective dismissals are regulated and enforced. Panel (c)
in Figure 1 display the indices averaged from 2000 to 2015 for our sample countries. The United
States has the lowest index (1) for employment protection in our sample, while the majority of
countries have an index of around 3. Markedly, Southern European countries tend to have stricter
employment protection, with Portugal (3.75) and Italy (3.14) having the highest index.
In sum, Figure 1 pieces together a picture of the institutions in various regions represented in
our sample. The United States stands out as the country with relatively low levels of government
involvement in healthcare financing, public spending on disability and sickness benefits, and em-
ployment protection, suggesting that the United States provides very little in social protections in
comparison to the other countries in our sample. China is similarly low on the health expendi-
ture measure, while being above average on employment protections. Broadly speaking, Europe
4In the last decade, a handful of municipalities have passed paid sick leave policies (Pichler and Ziebarth, 2017),
but there are currently no mandates at either the state or federal level.
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has stronger protections, but there is heterogeneity between regions: Northern Europe has higher
government spending on healthcare, disability and sickness, but average employment protection.
Southern Europe has higher employment protections, but average spending on health and disability.
Finally, Western Europe is close to average for all three measures, suggesting a moderate institu-
tional setup along multiple dimensions. These findings largely align with the regional breakdown
of Europe in our empirical microeconometric analysis, which we turn to next. There we examine
the direct and indirect consequences of a particular interaction with healthcare systems around the
world: a hospitalization.
3 Data and the Econometric Models
To examine the economic consequences of hospitalizations across countries, we use harmonized data
from countries around the world included in the Gateway to Global Ageing Data and follow the
event study design of Dobkin et al. (2018). We begin with a discussion of our data and sample
restrictions, and then describe our event study design and a model to correct our estimates for
timing differences across surveys.
3.1 Data
Our data come from three datasets in the Gateway to Global Ageing Data, which provides har-
monized survey data on aging around the world. We use the most recent eight biennial surveys of
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from the United States from 2000 to 2014, five biennial
surveys of the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) from 2007 to 2015,
and three biennial surveys of the China Health and Retirement Survey (CHARLS) from 2010 to
2014. Each of these datasets is a panel of individual-level and household-level data on health and
health services, employment, income and wealth, family connections, and other aspects relevant for
the study of aging, for a nationally representative sample of adults aged 50 and over.
9
3.1.1 Sample Selection
From these datasets, we make sample restrictions in order to isolate the appropriate sample as well
as to construct as harmonized a sample across countries as possible.5 For the HRS sample, we
restrict our sample to the years 2000 and onward despite survey data dating back to 1992. This
is because SHARE and CHARLS report after-tax earnings, and after-tax earnings in the HRS are
only systematically available beginning in 2000 from RAND. For SHARE, we restrict our sample
to the years 2007 and onward, because the survey in the wave prior to 2007 was conducted more
than two years earlier for many respondents and hence did not align with the biennial structure of
the other datasets. Moreover, instead of constructing separate samples for all countries in SHARE,
we construct samples of three broader geographical regions: Western Europe (Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg 2013 onwards, the Netherlands through 2013, and Switzerland),
Northern Europe (Denmark and Sweden), and Southern Europe (Greece 2007 and 2015, Italy,
Portugal 2011 and 2015, and Spain). These definitions conform to the geographical definition
constructed by United Nations Geoscheme for Europe, and align well with the grouping suggested
in Esping-Andersen (2013) and our country-level analysis in Section 2.6 As a robustness check, we
also consider alternative groupings of the European countries in Section 4.4.
Across all five samples, we keep individuals who are interviewed during the calendar year of the
survey year.7 We then restrict our sample to individuals who report a hospitalization at least once
during the sample period and index the first reported hospitalization as event time zero. Finally,
for the HRS and and CHARLS samples, we further restrict our sample to individuals who are
insured at the time of the indexed admission.8 We assume all individuals in our SHARE sample
are insured.9 We exclude the uninsured population entirely from the analysis because, for some
5Appendix A reports the effect on the sample size at each step of the sample selection process and the distribution
of individuals over event times in the analysis sample.
6These definitions exclude the following countries that are included in SHARE but do not fall into any of the three
sample definitions or do not contain more than one wave of data: Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Ireland, Israel, Poland, and Slovenia.
7This restriction is useful for the identification of implied effects for earnings outcomes, as will become clear in
Section 3.2.
8In the HRS, an individual is insured if s/he reports having private insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, or other public
insurance at the time of indexed admission. In CHARLS, an individual is insured if s/he reports having private,
public, or other insurance at the time of indexed admission.
9SHARE only surveyed whether respondents and spouses had government health insurance in the first wave. And
even then, a number of countries including Sweden, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Greece and Switzerland, did not include
this question in the survey. Given the very high levels of coverage (about 90%) in the countries that were surveyed
in the first wave of SHARE, we do not select the SHARE sample based on the limited health insurance information.
10
countries, we do not observe uninsured individuals at all, and thus including the uninsured would
make the cross-country comparison problematic.
3.1.2 Summary Statistics
Our final analysis sample includes 4,070 individuals in the United States, 3,088 individuals in
Western Europe, 564 individuals in Northern Europe, 915 individuals in Southern Europe, and 1,607
individuals in China. All of these individuals have a reported hospitalization during the sample
period, and we observe their health, health-related expenses, labor market outcomes, spousal labor
market outcomes, social insurance payments, and household income, before and after the indexed
admission.
Panel A of Table 1 provides an overview of the demographics of the analysis sample. The
average age at admission is around 55, which does not visibly differ across regions. The indexed
hospital admission occurs on average in the middle of the sample period for each sample, which
is important for estimating both pre-trends as well as post-hospitalization effects. In China, 86%
of the individuals have a spouse in the wave preceding the hospitalization, while only 54% in
Northern Europe do. Panel B reports subsequent hospitalizations following the indexed admission.
Individuals in the United States had the highest readmission rate within 12 and 36 months of the
index hospitalization (31% and 53%), while Northern Europe had the lowest rates (22% and 41%
for Northern Europe).
Panel C reports summary statistics of the outcome variables over the course of the sample,
including out-of-pocket medical expenses, respondent earnings, whether they work (full-time or
part-time), household social insurance payments, spouse earnings, and total household income. All
monetary values are annualized and converted to 2005 US dollars to ensure comparability. Detailed
variable construction is documented in Appendix B. There are wide disparities across regions.
Average out-of-pocket medical expenses are highest in the United States ($1,852), in contrast to
average medical expenditures below $500 in the other samples. For employment, Northern Europe
reports the highest percent of individuals working either full-time or part-time at 71%, followed
by China (68%), Western Europe (60%), the United States (57%), and Southern Europe (48%).
The United States has the highest annual total household income ($56,290), followed by Northern
Europe ($44,547), Western Europe ($34,839), Southern Europe ($19,440), and China ($1,981). It
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is noteworthy that even though the mean household income in our Chinese sample is only 3.5% of
that in the US sample, the mean out-of-pocket medical expenses in the Chinese sample is 15% of
its US counterpart.
One important point to note is that we do not restrict our sample to individuals without a prior
hospitalization in the previous wave as in Dobkin et al. (2018). This decision is driven by two data
availability issues. First, the European and Chinese panels are much shorter relative to the US
panel, and therefore conditioning on the lack of a prior hospitalization in the previous wave results
in losing 48% of the sample across all countries. Second, we observe hospitalizations only in the 12
months prior to the survey date in SHARE and CHARLS, while we observe hospitalizations over
the course of the entire 24 months between two survey dates in the HRS. In other words, we do not
even observe all potential hospitalizations in the European and Chinese samples, and thus what we
identify as the first hospital admission for a European or Chinese respondent might actually follow
a previous hospitalization that occurred in an unreported time window during the sample period.
Restricting the sample to individuals with no observable hospitalization in the prior wave could
further exacerbate this problem because we can condition on no prior hospitalizations in the last two
to four years for the US sample, but it is possible that we miss a prior hospitalization in the last 1-2
or 3-4 years in the other samples. This could potentially make our European and Chinese analysis
samples a mixture of unanticipated hospital admissions and anticipated hospital readmissions,
which tend to bias our results toward finding no effect if individuals can effectively plan ahead for
hospital readmissions. On the other hand, it could also bias our results toward stronger effects if
multiple hospitalizations signify more serious health problems. This is an important caveat to our
results, but it is reassuring that the broad patterns for the United States that emerge from our
study are similar to the findings in Dobkin et al. (2018) that condition on no hospitalization in the
prior wave.10
10Other differences in variable and sample definitions from those used in Dobkin et al. (2018) in order to better
match the HRS sample to the SHARE and CHARLS samples are: (a) converting earnings and income to post-tax
values, (b) starting with wave 5 (year 2000) for tax calculation purposes, and (c) converting out-of-pocket medical
expenses to an annual measure.
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3.2 Econometric Models
We estimate both nonparametric and parametric event study models for each country/region in
our sample, following Dobkin et al. (2018). For each outcome yict (i.e., out-of-pocket medical
expenditures, respondent earnings, work status, social insurance payments, spouse earnings, and
total household income) for individual i in cohort c and time t, the nonparametric event study
specifies:






µr + εict, (1)
where γct are coefficients on cohort-by-year fixed effects and µr are coefficients on indicators for
waves relative to the wave in which the first hospitalization is reported.11 The wave in which the
hospitalization is first observed for an individual is defined as event time zero, or r = 0, and the
omitted category is the wave prior to the hospitalization (µ−1). The number of event periods is
S = 3 for the United States and Europe, while the shorter time span of the CHARLS only allows
S = 2 for China.12 For all samples, we use survey weights and cluster standard errors at the
individual level.
One concern with a causal interpretation of event study coefficients is that the identifying
assumption is that, conditional on a hospitalization and controls, the timing of the hospitalization
is uncorrelated with outcomes. The nonparametric specification allows us to examine this by
estimating the pre-event outcomes. Given the presence of pre-trends for some variables, we then
additionally estimate a parametric event study specification that allows us to interpret the post-
hospitalization effects as causal under the assumption that the timing of the admission is not
correlated with deviations in outcomes from the pre-hospitalization trend in the outcomes. The
parametric event study specification is:
yict = γ′ct + δr +
S∑
r=0
µ′r + ε′ict. (2)
The only difference from the nonparametric specification is the linear time trend r, whose coefficient
11Cohort refers to the original age cohorts by which households were originally selected in the sampling frame.
12Due to the relatively low number of observations for event time -3 and 3 in the European sample (Table A-1 in
Appendix A), we also implement an estimation with S = 2 for both the United States and Europe as a robustness
check (see Section 4.4).
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δ captures a linear pre-trend in lieu of wave-specific effects. The parameter of interest, µ′r, then
expresses the change in a post-hospitalization outcome relative to its linear pre-event trend.
3.3 Implied Effects
Because the hospitalization could have taken place over a range of time (one or two years prior to
the event time zero interview, depending on the survey), it is difficult to interpret the persistence of
effects from the wave effects (i.e. the µr and µ′r). To pinpoint the effect of a hospital admission after
a certain amount of time has passed, we calculate “implied” effects. We follow the methodology
in Dobkin et al. (2018), but modify it for the SHARE and CHARLS samples to match the timing
assumptions in those surveys. We therefore describe the methodology for the SHARE and CHARLS
samples below, and refer the reader to Dobkin et al. (2018) for the derivations in the HRS sample.
In the SHARE and CHARLS samples, at event time zero a respondent reports that she was
admitted to a hospital in the past 12 months. To calculate the effect of the hospitalization on an
outcome e months later, such as work status or annual out-of-pocket medical expenses, we ideally
would know in what month the hospitalization occurred. Because the survey does not collect
this information, we assume that hospitalizations occur uniformly throughout the year, and hence
each observation has a 1/12th chance of the hospitalization occurring in each month of the past
year. Thus, the wave effect at event time zero, µ0, is a weighted average of implied effects βe for











where ωe is the probability of the hospitalization taking place e months prior to the survey (i.e.,
1/12). Of course, we cannot identify all βe’s from the three wave effects, so we assume that βe is a
linear spline in e, with nodes at the 12th and 36th months:
βe = α0(e > 0)e+ α1(e > 12)(e− 12) + α2(e > 36)(e− 36). (4)
Substituting the βe’s from equation (4) into the equations in (3), we have three equations (one for




To understand the full economic consequences from a hospital admission, we include in the out-
comes not only the direct cost of ensuing medical expenses, but also the indirect cost of lost work
opportunities and earnings. To understand the potential insurance mechanisms available to our
economic agents, we also examine changes in social insurance payments received by the house-
hold after the hospitalization and the changes in spousal earnings. Finally, to investigate whether
health outcomes vary across countries both before and after a hospitalization, we examine doc-
tor diagnoses, self-reported health, and health-related work limitations. We begin with estimates
from equations (1) and (2), then move to implied effects and robustness checks, and close with an
exploration of health conditions.
4.1 Wave Effects
We visualize the estimation results from the nonparametric specification (1) and the parametric
specification (2) in one figure, where the coefficients from the nonparametric specification, µr, are
estimated relative to the wave prior to the hospitalization and are plotted alongside a dashed line
representing the linear pre-trend δ from the parametric specification (normalized to run through
µ−1 = 0). Figures 2 to 7 show the results for all six main outcomes from each set of countries.
Before discussing the results, it is important to note that the look-back period for the hospital-
ization period differed across datasets. In the HRS, respondents are asked if they were hospitalized
since the last survey (i.e., the last two years), while in SHARE and CHARLS the look-back period
is only one year. Thus, relative to event time zero, hospitalizations on average occur further in the
past in the United States sample than the European and Chinese samples. These differences across
datasets will be explicitly taken into account when we calculate implied effects in Section 4.2.
In terms of out-of-pocket medical expenses in Figure 2, the United States, Western Europe, and
China all see a visible jump upon the indexed hospital admission, whereas in Northern and Southern
13Due to differences in the wording of the earnings and income survey questions, the calculation of implied effects
for these variables differ somewhat from the description above but follows the same logic. A complete description of
the derivation of the implied effects from the estimates of µr from the parametric specification are found in Appendix
C.
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Europe the effect sizes do not differ significantly from the pre-admission trend or even zero (that
is relative to the wave prior to the hospitalization), though the effect sizes in Southern Europe are
somewhat noisy. The effect in the United States is particularly persistent, remaining significantly
above the pre-trend line even five to six years after the hospital admission. We also observe a
significant and persistent drop in post-tax earnings after a hospitalization for the United States and
Western Europe samples, while the difference is not quite significant in Northern Europe, and there
is a significant and persistent increase in post-tax earnings in Southern Europe and China compared
to the trend line (Figure 3).14 This somewhat puzzling finding in Southern Europe and China is
driven by the downward sloping pre-trends in respondent earnings prior to the hospitalization. In
fact, while respondent earnings are significantly higher than the trend, they are not significantly
different from earnings in the wave prior to the hospitalization. A possible interpretation of this
finding is that the illness underlying a hospitalization is less debilitating in these regions than in
the United States or Western Europe, and hence once treated, workers are able to return to work
(as we will show in Section 4.5). Consistent with the earnings patterns, there is a significant and
persistent drop in employment in the United States and Western Europe (Figure 4). While there
is no significant difference from trend in Southern Europe and China, Northern Europe displays a
visible drop in work status without a significant accompanying drop in earnings after the indexed
admission. This could suggest strong labor protection in Northern European countries, where
workers are entitled to generous disability and sickness benefits, as is confirmed in Panel (b) of
Figure 1.
The next set of figures provide insight into potential insurance mechanisms available after a
hospitalization. Figure 5 shows the effect of a hospitalization on social insurance payments, which
include disability insurance, unemployment insurance, workplace injury compensation, retirement
pensions, and other government transfers such as food stamps and welfare assistance. Consistent
with realizing higher medical expenses and lower employment and earnings, individuals in the
United States and Western Europe receive significantly more social insurance payments after a
hospital admission. In the other regions, social insurance payments do not deviate significantly
from the pre-admission trend, although there are strong pre-trends in Northern and Southern
14One potential concern is how well is income measured in China. For that purpose, we re-conduct the analysis
using consumption expenditures surveyed in CHARLS as a robustness chek (Section 4.4).
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Europe. Figure 6 shows estimates of the effect of a hospitalization on spousal earnings and there is
no clear evidence that spousal earnings are substitutes (i.e., added worker effects) or complements
(which could occur if the hospitalized individual needs care from their spouse). In the United States
and China, for instance, spouses earn significantly more relative to pre-trend, but only several waves
after the hospitalization, while the opposite is true in Western Europe. Finally, Figure 7 reports
estimates for total household income. Consistent with the other outcomes for the United States,
individuals in the United States experience a similar decrease in total income. Income does not
deviate from trend in Northern Europe and Western Europe, while in Southern Europe and China
income marginally increases after a hospitalization. In China, this is perhaps in response to the
need to pay for high out-of-pocket medical expenses.
Since we do not observe the exact timing of hospital admissions, the “wave” effects in Figures
2 through 7 are averages over individuals who are admitted to a hospital at different dates within
a one-year (Europe and China) or two-year (United States) period prior to event time zero. In the
next two subsections, we explicitly take into account this window and report “implied effects” of
hospitalizations on outcomes 6 months and 24 months after the admission.
4.2 Implied Effects for Medical Expenses and Earnings
Table 2 reports the effects of a hospital admission on outcomes 6 months and 24 months post-
admission. It is worth stressing that despite different look-back periods across surveys, the implied
effects methodology adjusts for these differences and thus makes the effect sizes directly comparable
across regions. This comes, however, at the expense of strong assumptions on the (spline) linearity
of effects over time and thus also precision.
For both the United States and Western Europe, a hospital admission leads to both direct and
indirect economic consequences. For the United States, the direct cost is an increase in annual out-
of-pocket medical expenses of $772, or 2.9% of the pre-admission annual earnings, after 6 months
and it persists to $933, or 3.5% of the pre-admission earnings, after 24 months. The indirect cost
in terms of lost annual earnings is much larger and amplifies over time, at $3,093, or 11.7% of the
pre-admission earnings, after 6 months and $5,177 or 19.5% of the pre-admission earnings. For
Western Europe, the direct cost amounts to a significant 1.5% of pre-admission earnings, but the
indirect effects are too noisy to discern.
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In Northern and Southern Europe, none of the implied effects are significant, suggesting weak
but inconclusive evidence of economic costs from a hospital admission. This could be due to their
well-functioning universal health insurance systems, which essentially provide healthcare free of
charge to everyone, as well as strong labor protections that provide generous paid sick leave and
shield sick workers from job loss (Figure 1).
The pattern of effects in China is distinct from the other countries. The direct out-of-pocket
medical costs amount to a staggering 93% of the pre-admission earnings 6 months post-admission,
and this cost is persistent: by the 24th month, the effect is 82% of pre-admission earnings. This
is consistent with a medical insurance system in China that struggles to keep up with the rapidly
increasing medical bills charged by the increasingly privatized hospitals and clinics. Meanwhile,
there is no evidence of significant loss (either in magnitudes or statistically) in earnings following
hospitalization either in the short or the long run. One interpretation is that households cannot
afford to decrease their labor supply in response to a hospital admission.
The findings in this section suggest that, at least in some countries, hospitalizations lead not
only to direct medical expenditures, but also to negative labor market consequences. While health
insurance can combat the risk of costly medical care, it does not help with the indirect conse-
quences of hospitalizations. Other insurance mechanisms, such as spousal earnings and various
social insurance programs, are meant to target these risks. We next turn to an examination of
these mechanisms.
4.3 Implied Effects for Potential Sources of Insurance
Individuals who incur direct medical costs and labor market costs as a consequence of hospital-
izations may be insured against these costs through other mechanisms. While some insurance
mechanisms are already incorporated into our measured outcomes (for example, progressive taxa-
tion), others are not. Here, we examine two potential sources of additional insurance: government
transfers (social insurance) and spousal earnings (informal insurance).
In columns (4)-(6) of Table 2, we report the implied effects on household social insurance
payments, spousal earnings, and total household income from a hospital admission. The impacts
on social insurance payments are very noisy for Northern and Southern Europe, but there is a
significant increase for households in the United States (albeit small in magnitude) and Western
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Europe: a United States household on average receives $1,537 additional social insurance payments
24 months after the hospital admission, which is roughly 2.6% of the household’s pre-admission
total income. For Western Europe, the value is $5,356, or 14.6% of pre-admission total household
income. Figure 5 indicates that in Northern Europe there may also be a significant increase in social
insurance payments that emerges beyond 24 months post hospital admission, though it is does not
appear in the implied effects. Given that the mean age of hospital admission in our samples is
around 55, one possible reason for this later uptick is that individuals become eligible for pension
income once they reach the minimum retirement age.15
In terms of informal insurance, we do not find evidence that spouses increase their earnings
in most regions within 24 months post hospital admission, although these estimates are also quite
noisy. However, Figure 6 does suggest that spousal earnings rise above the pre-admission trend
beyond 24 months post-admission for the United States and China. This could reflect the possibility
that people remain in employment longer than they otherwise would after their spouse has a health
shock in their 50s. On the other hand, informal insurance could also take a non-pecuniary form, such
as caring for a spouse that needs help with day to day activities. If some spouses are reducing their
labor market activities to care for a sick partner (and saving on professional home care costs), this
would dilute the spousal earnings channel yet not show up as insurance unless we had time use data
or examined other health costs. Overall, there may well be insurance beyond those institutionalized
in the medical insurance system, the labor protection of sick employees, and government transfers
in each country. The effect of these other informal insurance mechanisms may take a few years
to surface, but may nevertheless be relevant for the long-run well-being of individuals who have a
major health shock towards the end of their work life.
4.4 Robustness Checks
We run a battery of additional specifications to check the robustness of our results, including 1)
running the analysis on an alternative definition of Northern Europe and pooling all countries in
Europe, 2) shortening the event time window to S = 2, and 3) using consumption measures as
outcomes in the Chinese data. We describe our findings briefly here. For detailed results, please
refer to our online Supplementary Material.
15Indeed, Dobkin et al. (2018) find evidence of pension income increases for their 60-64 year old sample.
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Our regional groupings of Europe in Section 3 were motivated by the United Nations Geoscheme
for Europe and Esping-Andersen (2013), but as Côté-Sergent et al. (2018) show, healthcare utilisa-
tion and health behavior can be different across geographically close countries. We investigate how
robust our results are when we vary the group membership in the European sample. We start from
treating Europe as a whole, where we find significant and positive effects on out-of-pocket medical
spending and insignificant and negative effects on earnings 6 and 24 months post-hospitalization.
The magnitudes of the estimates fall in the range of the estimates we obtain from the main spec-
ification. Then, we re-conduct our analysis on an alternative definition of Northern Europe that
includes Estonia and the Netherlands and find very similar results, and similarly for an alternative
definition of Southern Europe that adds Slovenia.
We also check the robustness of our results to the sampling window. In our main results, the
sampling window spans event time −3 through +3 (S = 3) for the United States and European
samples, while the Chinese sample spans −2 through +2. Longer windows allows for longer pre-
trend analysis as well as longer downstream effects, but the sample sizes are relatively small at
event time −3 for some regions. To check that the effects are not driven by these small sample
sizes in the event time tails, we run all regions using event time windows of −2 through +2, and
find similar results in terms of wave effects as well as implied effects.
Finally, one concern with the results from China is that the income and earnings measures may
be relatively noisy in comparison with the other datasets, and this may be driving some of our
results. To examine this further, we use measures of food consumption over the past week and
non-food nondurable consumption over the past month as alternative measures of total resources.
Similarly to the labor market effects in China, we find that hospitalizations have a negligible effect
on food and non-food consumption upon a hospital admission.
4.5 Health Outcomes
One potential reason behind the differences in economic outcomes across countries is that individu-
als may go to a hospital for systematically different reasons across countries that may be correlated
with economic outcomes. The pre-trends estimated in Figures 2 through 7 provide some sense of
the predictability of hospitalizations, but do not provide any measures of the health conditions
that trigger a hospitalization. To examine this, Table 3 calculates the average prevalence of seven
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doctor-diagnosed health conditions the wave prior to the hospital admission and the wave of the
hospital admission. Overall, hospitalized individuals in the United States are more likely to have
at least one condition both in the wave prior to hospitalization and in the wave of hospitalization.
This could be due to over-diagnosing of American physicians (or under-diagnosing in the other
countries), or it could mean that hospitalized individuals are, to some extent, sicker in the United
States than the other countries. If the latter interpretation is true, this could help explain the
higher direct and indirect costs of hospitalizations in the United States. On the other hand, by
this metric Chinese individuals are the next sickest, and while they also incur large medical costs,
they do not experience an income decline. Northern and Southern Europeans who are hospitalized
are least likely to have at least one diagnosis, consistent with small economic consequences of their
hospitalizations.
In terms of individual conditions, hospitalized Americans are much more likely to have high
blood pressure, diabetes, heart disease, and arthritis following a hospital admission. To the extent
that these conditions interfere with the ability to work, a hospitalization related to these conditions
could help explain the large labor market effects for the United States sample. Again, however,
these rates are also relatively high among the Chinese sample.
To investigate the direct effects of a hospitalization on health and its interaction with the labor
market, we estimate two additional event studies: Figure 8 estimates the effect of a hospitaliza-
tion on the probability that health limits the ability to work, and Figure 9 estimates the effect
on the probability that the individual’s self-reported health status is “poor.”16 The patterns are
similar for the two outcomes: individuals in the United States and Western Europe are much
more likely to have a work-limiting health condition and to report being in poor health relative
to trend. The results for the other samples are less conclusive, and Southern Europe and China
show strong pre-trends, mirroring the pre-trends in respondent earnings in Figure 3 and suggesting
that hospitalizations are less of an unanticipated shock in these regions. The fact that individuals
in the United States and Western Europe report worse health and work ability after a hospital-
ization and that they suffer in the labor market as a consequence suggests that their underlying
health conditions that triggered hospitalizations were more debilitating, hospitals provide lower
16Self-reported health status is ascertained by the respondent choosing either (1) excellent, (2) very good, (3) good,
(4) fair, or (5) poor.
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quality care, or that self-reports on health status may be endogenous to eligibility requirements for
incapacity-related programs.
Overall, evidence on the mechanisms for the observed differences in direct and indirect economic
costs of hospitalizations is mixed. Social insurance payments play a large role in the United States
and Western Europe in response to a hospitalization, meanwhile social insurance payments in
Northern and Southern Europe were on a steady upward trend prior to a hospitalization. There is
no clear pattern of spousal earnings as an insurance channel, though they do increase relative to the
pre-trend in the United States and China after the first couple of waves. Finally, work limitations
and health appear to be worse in the United States and Western Europe following a hospitalization,
which may help explain the labor market effects in these countries.
5 Impact of Social Protections
To test whether the makeup of a country’s social protection institutions is an important mechanism
for the effects we find in Section 4, this section uses a regression framework to examine how different
measures of social protections impact the sensitivity of out-of-pocket expenditures and respondent
earnings to hospitalizations. To do this, we collect annual, country-level data from the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
for each country available in our sample from 2001-2015. Our country-specific measures of health
systems include current health expenditures as a percentage of GDP, government health expendi-
tures as a percentage of current health expenditures, private health expenditures as a percentage
of current health expenditures, compulsory financing as a percentage of health expenditures, and
voluntary financing as a percentage of health expenditures. In addition to characteristics of health
systems, we also collect country-specific measures of disability and labor market protection, which
include disability and sickness benefits as a percentage of GDP, the unemployment replacement rate
at 12 months, collective bargaining coverage, and the OECD indicator of strictness of employment
protections.17
17The unemployment replace rate refers to the replacement salary of a worker who has a family with two children
and whose partner earns the average wage 12 months into unemployment. The collective bargaining coverage rate
corresponds to the ratio of employees covered by collective agreements, divided by all wage earners with right to
bargain. We use version 2 of the strictness of employment protection indicator, as it matches better with our sample
period. It is the weighted sum of sub-indicators concerning the regulations for individual dismissals and additional
provisions for collective dismissals.
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To examine how these measures impact the exposure of out-of-pocket medical expenditures and
respondent earnings to hospitalizations, we isolate the two waves prior to and after a hospitalization
in our sample, and run separate regressions of out-of-pocket medical expenditures and respondent
earnings on a “post hospitalization” indicator of the two waves following a hospitalization, as well as
a level and interaction term with a particular social protection measure. We normalize the measure
to have mean zero and standard deviation one to facilitate interpretation. We additionally include
cohort-wave fixed effects and country fixed effects, and cluster the standard errors at the country
level.
The results are in Table 4 for country-specific measures of health systems (columns 1 and 2),
disability systems (column 3) and employment protections (columns 4, 5, and 6). The first two
columns show that both the level and composition of health expenditures in a country can have a
significant effect on the out-of-pocket expenses following a hospitalization. Concentrating on the
interaction term between a hospitalization and a country-level measure, the more a country spends
on health in general (column 1), and the less a country’s health expenditures are spent by the
government (column 2), the less a hospitalization impacts out-of-pocket health expenditures. In
contrast to out-of-pocket spending, respondent earnings are largely unaffected by these country-
level healthcare measures. These results are consistent with our findings that in the United States
and China, a hospitalization leads to much higher out-of-pocket expenses than in the European
regions.
Columns 3 through 6 report the impact of the provision of disability and sickness benefits and
various measures of work protections. Higher public expenditures on disability and sickness ben-
efits (column 3), higher bargaining coverage rate (column 5), and stricter employment protection
(column 6) decrease the impact of a hospitalization on out-of-pocket expenditures, while the gen-
erosity of the unemployment insurance program (in terms of the replacement rate) has no effect
(column 4). For respondent earnings, however, only the strictness of employment protections has
a significantly positive effect on earnings: a one standard deviation increase in the strictness mit-
igates the decrease in earnings after a hospitalization by over $1,000. While the other variables
are not statistically significant, disability and sickness expenditures and unemployment insurance
generosity have similarly large coefficients. These results echo our findings that in countries with
high (low) levels of employment protection such as the Southern European countries (the United
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States), the labor market consequences from a hospitalization are mild (severe).18
These findings underscore the differences we find across countries in the impacts of hospital-
ization on ensuing health expenditures and downstream labor market effects, and suggest that
both the health systems and the labor protections of countries are fundamentally related to these
outcomes.
6 Conclusion
Economic risks that individuals face later in life can play a key role in the financial preparedness
for retirement and the overall wellbeing of older workers. Some risks can entail multiple sources
of loss; for example, adverse health shocks may lead to both medical costs (a direct loss) as well
as lost labor market earnings. While health insurance protects individuals from medical costs,
insurance against the negative labor market effects of adverse health shocks falls on other sources
of protection, such as disability, sick pay and benefits and labor market regulations.
This paper, through a micro-level examination of the effects of hospital admissions, documents
the economic consequences of such adverse health shocks across the world. By leveraging harmo-
nized data across many countries and executing the same estimation strategy across datasets, we
are able to provide careful and consistent comparisons across countries, allowing us to interpret
differences in effects as due to economic, institutional, and cultural differences rather than data or
methodological differences.
We find that the economic effects of hospitalizations vary substantially across the world. In
Northern and Southern Europe, hospitalized individuals face very little exposure to the direct
health costs associated with a hospitalization as well as the indirect labor market consequences.
In contrast, individuals in the Western Europe and the United States (as Dobkin et al. (2018) has
shown) are exposed to more direct health costs and negative labor market effects, though individuals
in Western Europe are better protected by social insurance. Individuals in China face the largest
direct costs (relative to prior earnings), yet do not have adverse labor market outcomes, perhaps as
a response to the need to pay for medical costs and the absence of strong social insurance programs.
The pattern of direct medical costs across countries can be explained to some degree by dif-
18A regression including all three types of protections (government health expenditures, disability and sickness
expenditures, and strictness of employment protection) yields similar results.
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ferences in health insurance programs: Northern and Southern Europe have very generous social
health insurance programs relative to the other countries in our sample. To help explain the la-
bor market patterns, we find analagous patterns that disability and sickness benefits are generally
more generous and labor market regulations are generally stricter in Northern and Southern Eu-
rope. Furthermore, we find that in countries where the government plays a large role in health
expenditures, disability expenditures, and employment protections, the effects of hospitalizations
on out-of-pocket health expenditures are dampened, and employment protections also dampen the
effect on earnings. It may also be true that some of these differential patterns may be due to
differences in the severity of conditions with which individuals either enter or exit a hospital ad-
mission. Indeed, individuals in the United States and Western Europe report more health-related
work limitations following a hospitalization, and Americans report more doctor-diagnosed diseases
prior to a hospitalization. Whether these are true health differences or are affected by eligibility
standards of various social programs (like disability), is an open question.
While this paper is an important step in understanding how adverse shocks interact with labor
markets and social protections, its scope is limited to the average effects of hospital admissions.
Adverse shocks may differentially impact individuals based on the resources at their disposal, and
thus an interesting direction for future research is to quantify the distributional impacts and link
them to measures of economic inequality across countries. In addition, individuals nearing or in
retirement face a host of other risks besides hospitalizations, including work-limiting disability,
long-term care needs, and other medical risks (Mommaerts, 2016). Future work that analyzes the
effects of these other risks on the wellbeing of older workers and retirees would be a fruitful direction
towards understanding the role of risk and social protections in household behavior and welfare.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
United Western Northern Southern
States Europe Europe Europe China
Panel A: Demographics
Age at admission 54.4 54.5 54.7 54.3 55.0
Male 45.8 51.1 44.9 48.5 46.8
Has spouse in wave prior to hospitalization 67.9 61.9 54.0 70.6 86.0
Year of admission 2006.0 2011.3 2010.7 2010.8 2011.9
Panel B: Subsequent outcomes
Readmitted within 12 months 30.5 27.5 21.5 24.2 21.5
Readmitted within 36 months 52.7 52.7 41.0 46.1 49.2
Panel C: Economic Outcomes
Out-of-pocket medical expenses 1,852 414 482 468 285
(2,857) (772) (575) (966) (504)
Respondent earnings 22,830 15,486 21,547 7,804 452
(27,737) (19,014) (18,273) (11,188) (1,112)
Working 57.0 59.7 71.4 48.2 68.0
(49.5) (49.0) (45.2) (50.0) (46.7)
Social insurance payments 4,927 6,673 6,094 4,489 163
(8,330) (15,030) (8,722) (7,722) (442)
Spousal earnings 19,354 9,929 14,392 5,707 422
(26,820) (15,963) (18,289) (9,751) (1,033)
Total household income 56,290 34,839 44,547 19,440 1,981
(50,301) (30,328) (28,138) (16,767) (2,736)
Individuals 4070 3088 564 915 1607
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1
and 0 (see text for details). All binary variables are multiplied by 100. Monetary outcomes are in 2005 US dollars.
All means are weighted by survey sampling weights. Readmission rates within 12 months include observations with
multiple hospitalizations at the wave of admission, while readmission rates within 36 months include admissions
reported in the following wave (2 years later) as well as readmissions from within 12 months (Europe and China are
missing readmissions between 12-24 months, however).
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Table 2: Implied effects of hospitalization for the non-elderly insured (ages 50-59 )
Out-of-pocket Working Household
medical Respondent part- or social insurance Spousal Total house-
spending earnings full-time payments earnings hold income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6 month effect
United States 772∗∗∗ -3,093∗∗ -3.8∗∗∗ 924∗∗∗ 1,371 -3,285
(85) (1,338) (1.3) (315) (1,304) (2,793)
Western Europe 283∗∗∗ -6,976 -10.0 5,747∗∗ -4,769 -665
(89) (5,334) (6.2) (2,847) (5,182) (9,163)
Northern Europe 141 -15,896 -18.7∗ 7,928∗ 2,898 526
(156) (11,637) (11.0) (4,640) (8,423) (15,373)
Southern Europe 456 6,708 2.5 -2,438 3,133 11,375
(313) (4,451) (8.9) (2,236) (3,774) (6,951)
China 443∗∗∗ 867 -7.2∗∗ 206 514 1,985
(24) (559) (3.4) (163) (512) (1,459)
24 month effect
United States 933∗∗∗ -5,177∗∗ -6.1∗∗ 1,537∗∗∗ 2,460 -5,607
(162) (2,223) (2.9) (520) (2,168) (4,574)
Western Europe 335∗∗ -5,754 -17.4∗ 5,356∗∗ -3,250 -420
(142) (4,274) (10.4) (2,351) (4,156) (7,569)
Northern Europe 136 -8,416 -28.8∗ 3,614 -2,112 -4,792
(257) (8,051) (17.2) (3,206) (6,474) (10,763)
Southern Europe 475 5,801 9.0 -1,346 2,571 9,801
(459) (4,069) (15.0) (2,057) (3,493) (6,442)
China 392∗∗∗ 62 -8.5 -16 126 -64
(43) (79) (6.3) (33) (79) (271)
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and
0 (see text for details). Each outcome-country pair report the implied effect and the standard error in parentheses.
See Section 3.3 for details on the calculation of implied effects. Standard errors, clustered by household, are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Percent of sample with health diagnoses prior to and wave of hospital admission
United Western Northern Southern
States Europe Europe Europe China
Wave prior to hospital admission
High blood pressure 47.5 38.9 25.9 27.7 30.7
Diabetes 17.3 15.0 7.4 12.2 11.8
Cancer 6.6 8.3 6.9 2.7 1.8
Lung disease 8.1 6.1 2.2 9.8 12.6
Heart disease 14.0 8.3 7.5 14.6 16.8
Stroke 4.3 2.1 4.8 3.5 2.6
Arthritis 49.5 22.4 20.3 22.3 41.4
Any condition 79.7 64.0 56.8 59.0 68.8
Wave of hospital admission
High blood pressure 53.2 41.9 34.0 35.3 34.5
Diabetes 21.0 16.3 11.6 13.9 16.8
Cancer 13.7 14.4 10.4 13.2 3.5
Lung disease 10.4 12.5 12.3 9.3 17.2
Heart disease 25.2 16.4 16.3 14.7 21.9
Stroke 7.7 4.9 6.7 2.2 5.6
Arthritis 54.5 27.8 27.8 28.3 44.2
Any condition 86.0 75.1 70.1 69.1 76.4
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and
0 (see text for details). Each diagnosis is a binary variable indicating whether a doctor ever told the individual they
had the condition. “Any condition” is whether they report any of the seven diagnoses. The wave prior to hospital
admission is event time -1, and the wave of hospital admission is event time 0.
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Table 4: Effect of hospitalizations on out-of-pocket health expenditures and respondent earnings,
by country health system characteristics and work protections
Panel A: Out-of-pocket expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post hospitalization 396.1∗∗∗ 135.8 434.8∗∗∗ 586.1∗∗∗ 439.6∗∗∗ 355.0∗∗∗
(20.6) (132.9) (50.0) (79.2) (12.9) (7.0)
Current health exp as % of GDP -755.8∗∗∗
(206.0)
... x post hospitalization 180.7∗∗∗
(5.5)
Govt health exp as % of health exp 430.3∗∗∗
(85.9)
... x post hospitalization -359.7∗∗∗
(89.2)
Disability and sickness exp as % of GDP -30.8
(151.0)
... x post hospitalization -198.9∗∗∗
(47.4)
Unemployment replacement rate at 12 months 63.6
(43.7)




... x post hospitalization -212.2∗∗∗
(14.1)
Strictness of employment protection 1991.9∗∗∗
(551.8)
... x post hospitalization -231.1∗∗∗
(5.7)
Observations 11991 11991 10083 10083 8515 9966
Panel B: Respondent earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post hospitalization -2599.2∗∗∗ -2846.7∗∗ -3307.2∗∗∗ -3403.5∗∗∗ -3919.7∗∗∗ -2464.8∗∗∗
(491.7) (1207.1) (1060.6) (903.3) (645.9) (551.2)
Current health exp as % of GDP 2685.6
(5115.6)
... x post hospitalization -863.1
(525.4)
Govt health exp as % of health exp 1550.5
(1815.7)
... x post hospitalization -55.3
(1112.9)
Disability and sickness exp as % of GDP -1293.0
(3729.8)
... x post hospitalization 809.5
(1157.0)
Unemployment replacement rate at 12 months 1441.8
(921.8)




... x post hospitalization -255.9
(712.4)
Strictness of employment protection 21896.0∗
(12134.5)
... x post hospitalization 1076.9∗∗
(470.2)
Observations 13226 13226 11322 11322 9227 11201
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized. “Post hospitalization”
includes the first two waves after the hospitalization, and is otherwise the two waves prior to the hospitalization.
Interaction terms are annual country-specific measures from the WHO and OECD, normalized. Specifications include
cohort x wave fixed effects and country fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 1: Social protection measures, by country




























































































Note: Data from WHO and OECD, 2000-2015, normalized within the sample. Strictness of employment pro-
tections is the weighted sum of sub-indicators concerning the regulations for individual dismissals and additional
provisions for collective dismissals (version 2). The country codes stand for: AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium,
DNK=Denmark, FRA=France, DEU=Germany, GRC=Greece, ITA=Italy, LUX=Luxembourg, NLD=the Nether-
lands, PRT=Portugal, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, CHE=Switzerland, USA=the United States, CHN=China.32
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 45.8
Individuals = 1,607
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 478.3
Individuals = 1,607
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 76.7
Individuals = 1,599
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 124.9
Individuals = 1,606
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 521.2
Individuals = 1,591
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization














-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 2,039
Individuals = 1,392
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 40.7
Individuals = 1,263
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard
errors are clustered at the household level.
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Survey Wave relative to Hospitalization
Pre-Hospitalization Mean = 32.5
Individuals = 1,574
China
Note: The sample is insured individuals aged 50-59 in each survey who were hospitalized between event time -1 and 0 (see text for details). The figure plots the
µr terms from equation (1) in red and the 95% confidence intervals in gray. The dashed line is the estimated pre-trend (δ) from equation (2), normalized to zero
at event time -1. The regression controls for wave-cohort-country fixed effects, and is weighted using person weights provided by the respective survey. Standard




Table A-1: Sample selection and event time sample sizes
United Western Northern Southern
States Europe Euorpe Europe China
Panel A. Raw Data to Analysis Sample
Total # of individuals, all years 22753 19891 5153 10192 10443
Total # of individuals, relevant waves 15209 17405 4359 9081 10443
Total # of individuals, survey years 14751 16469 4069 9015 10395
Individuals with hospitalization 4706 3088 564 915 1727
Individuals with hospitalization and insurance 4070 3088 564 915 1607
Panel B. Observations per event time
Event time: -3 498 74 37 30 0
Event time: -2 1072 405 91 131 449
Event time: -1 1976 949 161 192 1001
Event time: 0 4070 3088 564 915 1607
Event time: 1 3172 1464 239 272 948
Event time: 2 2565 841 170 273 388
Event time: 3 1887 221 96 118 0
Note: The first row of Panel A contains all individuals in all years of the surveys (United States: HRS; Europe:
SHARE; China: CHARLS). The second row limits the sample to waves 5-11 of the HRS (years 2000-2014), waves 2
and 4-6 of SHARE (years 2007-2015), and waves 1-3 of CHARLS (years 2011-2015). The third row further limits the
sample to observations for which the interview fell during the calendar year of the survey, and the remaining rows
further limit the sample to individuals who experienced a hospitalization (fourth row) and additionally were insured
during the wave of hospitalization (fifth row). This last sample is our analysis sample, and event time zero is the
wave during which the hospitalization was reported.
B Variable Definitions
We document how we construct and harmonize the key variables from different surveys. The Har-
monized Studies in the Gateway to Global Aging Data has conveniently facilitated the comparison.
We fine tune our data on based on their structure. We convert all nominal monetary values to real
2005 US dollars. For SHARE, we first use the Consumer Price Index (CPI, all-items) for the Euro
area to convert the nominal values to real 2005 Euro and use the Euro-USD exchange rate in 2005
to convert them to 2005 US dollars. For CHARLS, we follow the same procedure using the CPI
for China and the CNY-USD exchange rate in 2005. We additionally topcode and bottomcode all
continuous variables to their 99th and 1st percentile values, respectively.
Recent hospitalization. We define a hospitalization as one occurring within the previous one or
two years, depending on the survey. In the HRS, the variable RwHOSP indicates the respondent’s
overnight hospital stay in previous two years. In SHARE and CHARLS, the variable RwHOSP
indicates the respondent’s overnight hospital stay in the previous 12 months. We focus on the first
hospital stay reported in our analysis sample.
Out-of-pocket medical expenses. We define out-of-pocket medical expenses as the amount of
money spent over the previous 12 months on medical expenses. In the HRS, the variable RwOOPMD
contains the out-of-pocket medical expenses since last survey (i.e. for two years). We divide the
value by 2 to convert it to an annual measure, to be consistent with the counterparts in SHARE
and CHARLS. The expenditures captured are hospital costs, nursing home costs, doctor visits
costs, dental costs, outpatient surgery costs, average monthly prescription drug costs, home health
care costs, and special facilities costs. In SHARE, the variable RwOOPMD1Y contains the out-
of-pocket medical expenditures in the previous year. They capture hospital costs, doctor and
outpatient costs, drugs costs, home care/nursing home costs, and dental costs, the last of which
is available only since wave 5. In CHARLS, there is no single variable that gives the total out-of-
pocket medical expenditures. We construct a CHARLS analog of out-of-pocket medical expenses
by summing three relevant variables, RwOOPHOS1Y, RwOOPDOC1M, and RwOOPDEN1Y. The
three variables contain out-of-pocket hospital costs last year, doctor visits costs last month, and
dental costs last year, the last of which is available only since wave 2.
Current work status. We define the working variable as a binary variable that takes the value
of one if the respondent is “working,” which varies slightly by survey. In the HRS, variable RwL-
BRF indicates the current labor force status of a respondent in each wave. RwLBRF summarizes
whether the respondent is working full-time, working part-time, unemployed, partly retired, re-
tired, disabled, or not in the labor force. We count an individual as “working” if they are working
full-time or part-time. In SHARE, the variable RwLBRF S captures whether the respondent is
employed/self-employed, retired, permanently sick/disable, or a homemaker. Unlike RwLBRF in
the HRS, RwLBRF S does not feature the status of partly retired and not in labor force. We
count an individual as “working” if they are employed or self-employed. In CHARLS, the variable
RwLBRF C includes finer categories of labor market activities, including different types of agri-
culture work, non-agriculture employed, non-agriculture self-employed, unemployed, retired, and
never work. We count an individual as “working” if they are employed or self-employed in the
agricultural or non-agricultural sector.
Social insurance payments. In HRS, we use various variables to construct household social
insurance payments in a previous calendar year. It is the sum of respondent’s income from Social
Security Disability (SDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (RwISSDI ), spouse’s income
from SDI and SSI (SwISSDI ), respondent’s individual income from unemployment and worker
compensation (RwIUNWC ), spouse’s individual income from unemployment and worker compen-
sation (SwIUNWC ), respondent’s individual income from Social Security retirement, spouse or
widow benefits (RwISRET ), spouse’s individual income from Social Security retirement, spouse or
widow benefits (SwISRET ), respondent’s income from veteran’s benefits, welfare, and food stamps
(RwIGXFR), and spouse’s income from veteran’s benefits, welfare, and food stamps (SwIGXFR).
In SHARE, we construct household social insurance payments in the previous year by sum-
ming up respondent’s public disability pension (RwITSSDI ), spouse’s public disability pension
(SwITSSDI ), respondent’s public old age and early retirement pension (RwITSRET ), spouse’s
public old age and early retirement pension (SwITSRET ), respondent’s individual income from
other government transfers (RwITGXFR), and spouse’s individual income from other government
transfers (SwITGXFR).
In CHARLS, the household social insurance payments in the previous year is the sum of the
respondent’s public pension income (RwIPUBPEN ), the spouse’s public pension income (SwIPUB-
PEN ), and total household government/public transfer income (HHwIGXFR). More specifically,
the variable HHwIGXFR is the sum of HHwIGXFRI, HHwIGXFRH, and HHwIGXFRT. This vari-
able includes annual household government transfer income (unemployment compensation, pension
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subsidy, worker’s compensation from industrial accident compensation insurance, elderly family
planning subsidies, medical aid, social assistance and others) as captured by HHwIGXFRI ; annual
other government transfer income (minimum income guarantee (dibao), subsidy from reforestation,
agricultural subsidies, rural five guarantee (wubao), poverty relief (tekun), work injury subsidies to
the immediate family members, emergency or disaster relief (jiujikuan, jiucaikuan) and others) as
captured by HHwIGXFRH; and annual household other public transfer income (donation from
the society, compensation for land seizure, compensation to pulling down house or apartment) as
captured by HHwIGXFRT .
Household total income. In HRS, the variable HwITOT is the sum of all income in a house-
hold from the previous calendar year. That is, it is the sum of respondent’s earnings (RwIEARN ),
spouse’s earnings (SwIEARN ), household’s capital income (HwICAP), respondent’s income from
pensions and annuities (RwIPENA), spouse’s income from pensions and annuities (SwIPENA), re-
spondent’s income from SDI and SSI (RwISSDI ), spouse’s income from SDI and SSI (SwISSDI ), re-
spondent’s income from Social Security retirement, spouse or widow benefits (RwISRET ), spouse’s
income from Social Security retirement, spouse or widow benefits (SwISRET ), respondent’s in-
come from unemployment and worker’s compensation (RwIUNWC ), spouse’s income from unem-
ployment and worker’s compensation (SwIUNWC ), respondent’s income from veteran’s benefits,
welfare, and food stamps (RwIGXFR), spouse’s income from veteran’s benefits, welfare, and food
stamps (SwIGXFR), and other household income such as alimony, lump sums from insurance,
pension, and inheritance (HwIOTHR). Note that, by construction, the household income refers
to a household of two members, the respondent and the spouse, no reference to other potential
household members.
In SHARE, the variable HwITTOT records the sum of all the after tax income of a household
in a previous year. HwITTOT is the sum of respondent’s earnings (RwITEARN ), spouse’s earn-
ings (SwITEARN ), respondent’s income from employer old age pension or annuity (RwITPENA),
spouse’s income from employer old age pension or annuity (SwITPENA), respondent’s income from
public disability pension, old age pension, early retirement pension (RwITPUBPEN ), spouse’s in-
come from public disability pension, old age pension, early retirement pension (SwITPUBPEN ),
respondent’s income from government transfers such as public unemployment benefits/insurance
and public long term care insurance (RwITGXFR), spouse’s income from government transfers such
as public unemployment benefits/insurance and public long term care insurance (SwITGXFR), re-
spondent’s other income from regular life insurance payments, regular private annuity/private per-
sonal pension payments, alimony, and regular payment from charities (RwITOTHR), and spouse’s
other income from regular life insurance payments, regular private annuity/private personal pension
payments, alimony, and regular payment from charities (SwITOTHR). In the first wave of SHARE,
we have before-tax household income (HwITOT ), which is converted to after-tax household income
(HwITTOT ) by using an additional tax module provided by SHARE.
In CHARLS, the variable HHwITOT records the total household income in the last year. It is
the sum of the following nine items: respondent’s earnings after tax (RwITEARN ), spouse’s earn-
ings after tax (SwITEARN ), household’s total capital income (HHwICAP), respondent’s pension
income (RwIPEN ), spouse’s pension income (SwIPEN ), household’s government/public transfer
income (HHwIGFR), respondent’s other income (RwIOTHR), spouse’s other income (SwIOTHR).
Respondent earnings. In HRS, respondent earning is the sum of RwIEARN and RwISEMP,
net of taxes. RwIEARN records the respondent’s earnings in the last calendar year, which in-
clude wage/salary income, bonuses/overtime pay/commissions/tips, 2nd job or military reserve
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earnings, professional practice or trade income. RwISEMP consists of respondent’s earnings from
self-employment. Taxes are provided from year 2000 onward from RAND (WwFED TAX, Ww-
STA TAX, WwFICA TAX). To calculate approximate taxes for earnings (since tax burden is cal-
culated from total income, not only earnings), we divide the sum of these three variables by total
household income to create an individual tax rate, and apply this tax rate to earnings.
In SHARE, respondent’s earning is the sum of RwITEARN and RwITSEMP. RwITEARN
records the respondent’s post-tax earnings in the previous year, which include labor earnings,
bonuses, commission, tips and income from professional practices. RwITSEMP consists of respon-
dent’s earnings from self-employment in the previous year. It is important to note that the first
wave of SHARE provides pre-tax income, for which we use an additional tax module to estimate
the after-tax income.
In CHARLS, we construct respondent’s earnings by summing two variables RwITEARN and
RwITSEMP. The latter variable is a sub component of household capital income (HHwICAP). The
former variable RwITEARN records the respondent’s after-tax earnings in the last year (wages
and bonus income) and the RwITSEMP records the respondent’s after-tax net income earned
from self-employed activity in the last year. Note that if the self-employed activity is conducted
at the household level, neither the respondent or the spouse reports income from household-level
self-employment individually. Instead, income from household-level self-employment is recorded in
HHwITSEMP, which is not included in the baseline measure of respondent’s earnings.
Spousal earnings. In HRS, spousal earnings is the sum of SwIEARN and SwISEMP, net of
taxes. SwIEARN records the spouse’s earnings in the last calendar year, which include wage/salary
income, bonuses/overtime pay/commissions/tips, 2nd job or military reserve earnings, professional
practice or trade income. SwISEMP consists of spouse’s earnings from self-employment. Taxes are
calculated in the same way that respondent earnings taxes are calculated above.
In SHARE, spouse’s earning is the sum of SwITEARN and SwITSEMP. SwITEARN records
the spouse’s earnings in the previous year, which include labor earnings, bonuses, commission,
tips and income from professional practices. SwITSEMP consists of spouse’s earnings from self-
employment. It is important to note that the first wave of SHARE provides pre-tax income, for
which we use an additional tax module to estimate the after-tax income.
In CHARLS, we construct spouse’s earnings by summing two variables SwITEARN and SwIT-
SEMP. The latter variable is a sub component of household capital income (HHwICAP). The former
variable SwITEARN records spouse’s after-tax earnings in the last year (wages and bonus income)
and the SwITSEMP records spouse’s after-tax net income earned from self-employed activity in
the last year. Note that if the self-employed activity is conducted at the household level, neither
the respondent or the spouse reports income from household-level self-employment individually.
Instead, income from household-level self-employment is recorded in HHwITSEMP, which is not
included in the baseline measure of spouse’s earnings.
Whether health limits work. For all three surveys, we create a binary variable for whether a
health condition limits the ability to work. However, there are differences in how the question is
asked in each survey. In the HRS variable RwHLTHLM, respondents are asked: “Do you have any
impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do?” In the
SHARE variable RwHLTHLMA, instead of “paid work” it asks if a health condition limits “activities
people usually do.” In the CHARLS variable RwHLTHLM C, the question asks how many days
in the past year were missed, and a value above zero is coded as having a work limitation. An
additional difference is that in the HRS and CHARLS, an alternative answer is “not working”;
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individuals who answered in this way are not captured.
Self-reported health status. For all three surveys, respondents are asked to self-report their
general health status in RwSHLT, with options of 1 (excellent), 2 (very good), 3 (good), 4 (fair),
and 5 (poor). Our measure of poor health is a binary variable that equals to one for everyone who
rated their health as a 5 and equals zero for those who rated their health 1-4.
C Derivation of the Implied Effects
In the estimating equation, we estimate µr for r = 0, 1, 2..., where µr is the effect of a hospitalization
within the 12 (24) months prior to event time 0 on the outcome in wave r in SHARE and CHARLS
(in HRS). These are wave effects, but they are difficult to interpret because they imply different
effect sizes based on when individuals were interviewed and when the hospitalization took place.
To translate these wave effects into “implied effects” such as “the effect of hospitalization on
annual earnings 6 months after the hospitalization”, we must account for the different timing of
hospitalization in our sample. We present the calculation for the implied effects for HRS and the
other two data sets separately, and for earnings variables and the other variables separately, since
the framing the survey questions is different along these dimensions.
C.1 HRS
In HRS, respondents are asked if they had been admitted to a hospital since the last survey, which
is effectively in the last 24 months. This is different than either SHARE or CHARLS, where
respondents are asked if they have been admitted to a hospital in the last 12 months. For this
reason, we present the derivation for HRS and the other data sets separately. When surveying
about earnings, respondents are asked to recall the earnings of the last calendar year. When
surveying about out-of-pocket medical expenses, respondents are asked to recall the total expenses
in the last 12 months. To account for the differences in the framing, we present the calculation of
the implied effects for earnings variables first and then for the other outcomes.
C.1.1 Earnings Outcome
Let βe be effect of hospitalization on earnings (in the prior 12 months) at the eth month following
hospitalization. We observe µ0, which is the effect of a hospitalization in the past 12 months on








where ωe is the probability weight of observing someone who is admitted to hospital e months
before interview. Assume that there is zero effect of hospitalization on the outcome prior to the
hospitalization so that βe = 0, ∀e < 0. We can calculate the weights ωe by assuming that the timing
of hospitalization is distributed uniformly over the 24 months before the interview. Assuming a
linear spline with three knots at 0 month, 12th month and 36th month, we have βe to follow the
functional form:
βe = α0(e > 0)e+ α1(e > 12)(e− 12) + α2(e > 36)(e− 36).
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Note that we have the wave effects µr’s from the estimation and we can compute the coefficient
matrix and hence we can solve for α’s. Once we have the α’s, it’s straight-forward to compute βe.
C.1.2 Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses and Other Outcomes
Keep the assumption that the time of hospitalization is uniformly distributed over the 24 months
before the interview. The weights ωe are then all 1/24. We can write down the system of equations






















C.2 SHARE and CHARLS
In SHARE and CHARLS, respondents are asked if they have been hospitalized in the last 12 month.
The framing of outcome-related questions is similar to the HRS.
C.2.1 Earnings Outcome











e=1 ωee 0 0∑35
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C.2.2 Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenses and Other Outcomes












e=1 ωee 0 0∑36
e=25 ωee
∑36
e=25 ωe(e− 12) 0∑60
e=49 ωee
∑60
e=49 ωe(e− 12)
∑60
e=49 ωe(e− 36)
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